The lying oracle problem is a problem of finding the optimal strategies in a two-person game where an oracle predicts the outcomes of coin flips and a player bets on the outcomes. The oracle announces whether the coin will land heads or tails, but may at times lie. We analyze the variant of the game which uses a biased coin, where the probability p that the coin lands heads is common knowledge. We determine optimal strategies for both the oracle and player, and we give an explicit expression for the expected payoff to the player when the coin is flipped n times and the oracle may lie at most k times.
Introduction
The lying oracle problem as given in [3] is the problem of finding the optimal strategies in a two-person game between an oracle and a bettor (the player). The oracle agrees to flip a coin n times and will predict the outcome accurately, except that the oracle may lie up to k times. Before each prediction, the player places a bet of any amount up to the player's current holdings. The oracle will then announce the outcome, after which the player must state the outcome on which to bet. The problem is to determine the optimal wagers and strategy for the player, and to determine with what probabilities the oracle should tell the truth and lie about the coin's outcome.
It was shown in [3] that in the game of n flips and k lies, there is a unique critical wager w c = w c (n, k) (represented as a proportion of the player's current holdings) such that any wager w satisfying w c ≤ w ≤ 1 is optimal. Furthermore, given that w c ≤ w ≤ 1, the oracle should tell the truth with probability P t = Subsequent work by Ravikumar [5] demonstrated a reciprocal relationship between the lying oracle problem and the continuous version of Ulam's liar game. In that game, a questioner searches for a number in the interval [0, 1], chosen by a responder. The questioner's task is to find a subset of smallest measure that contains the number. The questioner asks the responder n questions about the number's location in the interval, but the responder may lie up to k times. This game has been studied in connection with binary search in the presence of errors in [6] . There it was shown that optimal play by both the questioner and responder yields a set of measure k i=0 n i /2 n , which is the reciprocal of the expected value of the game in the lying oracle problem.
Additionally, work in [4] described a path-guessing game in which two players traverse a directed graph. At each vertex, one player attempts to guess to which of the available vertices the other player will choose to visit next. The goal is for the first player to place wagers on which vertex the guide will choose so as to maximize his final winnings after multiple steps. This model also provides the means for the analysis of a lying oracle problem of infinite duration, as was shown in [4] . Of course, the specific values of α t and α depend on the particular restrictions governing the game (e.g. the values of n and k), and on the stage of play that the game has reached.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we derive the optimal strategies for both the oracle and the player in terms of p, w, α t , and α . In Section 3 we apply the analysis to the original lying oracle game of n flips and k lies. Section 4 gives an extended example of this game. We conclude in Section 5 with some conjectures and open problems.
Optimal play in stage one
This section addresses the game that consists of a single coin toss, after which the payoff from that coin toss is multiplied by one of the values α t or α . Subsequently, we will extend the results of this section to multiple-flip games. Our goal is to derive optimal strategies for the player and the oracle in this one-step game. To simplify the presentation, we will assume that p ≥ 1 2 and α > α t . There is no loss of generality here, because the complementary cases are covered by reversing the roles of heads and tails, and truth and lies. (The case where α = α t is trivial.)
Intuitively, three basic principles seem necessary for optimal play.
Principle 1.
The oracle must make sure that his announcement gives the player no real information as to the actual outcome of the coin toss.
Principle 2. The player, knowing this, should make his decision of whether to agree or disagree with the oracle completely independently of the oracle's announcement.
Principle 3.
Because the player benefits more when the oracle lies than when he tells the truth, the oracle should tell the truth with higher probability than he lies.
With the help of these principles we will derive a class of strategies for the players. We will then prove that these strategies are in fact optimal. We begin by delineating the strategies available to the oracle and the player. First consider the oracle. The oracle's basic decision is whether to lie or tell the truth, but this decision may well depend on whether the coin landed heads or tails. Thus, the oracle actually has two separate decisions: whether to lie when the coin lands heads and whether to lie when the coin lands tails. We allow the oracle to play probabilistically, so there is a probability that the oracle tells the truth when the coin lands heads, Note also that, by the law of total probabilities, the unconditional probability that the oracle tells the truth is P t = Pr(oracle tells the truth) = P t|H p + P t|T (1 − p) .
(1)
Now consider strategies for the player. The player's basic decision is whether to agree or disagree with the oracle, but this decision may depend on whether the oracle announces heads or tails. Therefore, the player's decision is specified by the two probabilities Q a|says H = Pr(player agrees with oracle | oracle announces heads) and Q a|says T = Pr(player agrees with oracle | oracle announces tails).
The player's pure strategies correspond to
We will denote the unconditional probability that the player agrees with the oracle by Q a = Pr(player agrees with oracle).
In addition, the player must also choose a wager w ∈ [0, 1]. We consider the player's wager to be deterministic, but still the player must choose the optimal value for the wager. The player's fortune at the end of the one-step game (i.e. after multiplication by α t or α ) will be denoted by F . Optimal play can be derived by considering the expected value of F under a given player's pure strategies as a function of the other player's strategy. Looking at the oracle's pure strategies, we have the following.
1. P t|H = 0, P t|T = 0: the oracle lies. Then
2. P t|H = 0, P t|T = 1: the oracle announces tails. Then
3. P t|H = 1, P t|T = 0: the oracle announces heads. Then
4. P t|H = 1, P t|T = 1: the oracle tells the truth. Then
For the player, we have 1. Q a|says H = 0, Q a|says T = 0: the player disagrees with the oracle. Then
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3. Q a|says H = 1, Q a|says T = 0: the player bets on heads. Then
4. Q a|says H = 1, Q a|says T = 1: the player agrees with the oracle. Then
Equilibria can be found by equating the expected values for each player, and then solving for the other player's strategy. We take a different approach here. We will use Principles 1-3 above to derive candidate optimal strategies. We will then prove that these strategies are optimal using (2)-(9).
Principle 1 states that the oracle's announcement should convey no information about the coin toss. Another way of saying this is that the oracle's announcement should be independent of the oracle's decision whether to lie or not:
Pr(oracle tells the truth | oracle announces heads) = P t .
Expanding the conditional probability, we obtain
Principle 2 states that the player should make his decision to agree or disagree independently of the oracle's announcement:
Principle 3 states that the oracle should tell the truth with higher probability than he lies. But how much higher? Perhaps the simplest choice is to make the probability of telling the truth (or lying) inversely proportional to the value of telling the truth (or lying):
We shall take (10)-(12) as the starting points for our derivation of candidate optimal strategies. Solving (1) and (10) simultaneously in light of (12) gives
and
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Note that, when p = 1 2 , we have P t|H = P t|T = α /(α + α t ), while p = α /(α + α t ) gives P t|H = 1 and P t|T = 0. Therefore, (13) and (14) are valid probabilities as long as p satisfies
Accordingly, we restrict to this case first. What is the player's expected fortune if the oracle adopts the strategy given by (13) and (14)? Substituting (13) and (14) into (6)- (9), we see that, for each of the player's pure strategies, we have
Note that H is the harmonic mean of the values α t and α . Since any mixed strategy is a convex combination of the pure strategies, it follows that the player's expected fortune under any strategy whatsoever is still equal to H , provided that the oracle uses the strategy given by (13) and (14). Moreover, it is straightforward to show that if the oracle uses any other strategy then the player can find a strategy that makes his expected fortune strictly greater than H . (For instance, if the oracle chooses a strategy that makes P t < α /(α + α t ) then the player could use his pure strategy (6) with w = 1, which yields E[F ] = 2(1 − P t )α > H. Other cases are handled similarly.) This proves that (13) and (14) constitute an equilibrium strategy for the oracle. Still assuming (15), now consider the situation from the player's point of view: he knows that the coin is heads with probability p, while the oracle tells the truth with probability P t = α /(α + α t ) ≥ p (because (15) holds). Thus, the oracle is at least as reliable as the coin in this case, and it would seem that the player could not do any better than to agree with the oracle. This along with (11) gives
The player also needs to decide on a wager. Here we adopt the usual procedure of choosing a wager such that the player's expected fortune is the same whether or not the oracle lies. An easy calculation gives
Substituting (16) and (17) into the oracle's pure strategies, (2)- (5), we find that not only does (2) continue to hold for all the pure strategies, but in fact the player's fortune is nonrandom:
Since this is the case for each of the oracle's pure strategies, it must hold for any mixed strategy as well. Thus, by adopting the strategy given by (16) and (17), the player can guarantee himself a fortune of H , no matter which strategy the oracle adopts. But all that is required for an equilibrium is that the expected value of the player's fortune equals the harmonic mean. This leads to a wider class of equilibrium strategies for the player. Necessary and sufficient conditions for an equilibrium strategy are found by equating (2)-(5) under assumption (15). This is a straightforward exercise that results in a class of mixed strategies for the player. To describe them, denote the value given by (17) as the critical wager w c :
The equilibrium strategies for the player are characterized by a wager w that is at least as large as the critical wager,
and a probability of agreement given by
Substituting (18) and (19) into (2)- (5), we see that the expected value of the player's fortune under all the oracle's pure strategies is again equal to H . It can also be shown that if the player uses any strategy other than those given by (18) and (19), then the oracle has a strategy that reduces the player's expected fortune below H . (In particular, if Q a|says H = Q a|says T then one of (3) or (4) will be less than H , while if (2Q a − 1)w = w c then either (2) or (5) will be less than H .) This shows that (18) and (19) constitute the equilibrium strategies for the player in the case (15). Note that if the player wagers the critical amount w c then this is the same pure strategy derived above. Wagers greater than the critical amount give optimal mixed strategies. In the extreme case, when w = 1, the optimal probability of agreement is
which is the same as the oracle's probability of telling the truth. An interesting aspect of case (15) is that it actually benefits the oracle to be more reliable than the coin. This in turn entails another interesting fact: the player's optimal strategies do not depend on p so long as (15) holds. The remaining case is
Note that in the boundary case when p = α /(α + α t ) the oracle is announcing heads with probability 1 by (13) and (14). Thus, the oracle and the coin are equally reliable at this boundary case. If (20) holds, however, then the oracle can no longer be more reliable than the coin and still avoid giving information to the player. But he can remain equally as reliable as the coin, and still avoid giving information to the player, by simply continuing to announce heads with probability 1. This is in fact optimal for the oracle. To see this, note that if the player bets his entire fortune on heads regardless of what the oracle announces then his expected fortune is at least 2pα t (recall that α t < α ), with equality if and only if the oracle announces heads with probability 1. So the oracle cannot hope to reduce E[F ] below this value. Can the player do any better than an expected fortune of 2pα t ? In other words, could it possibly benefit the player to bet on tails with positive probability? We claim not. To see this, let Q T be the unconditional probability that the player bets on tails. Let the oracle's strategy continue to be to announce heads with probability 1. Then the player's expected fortune is
Note that the first term in square brackets is positive because of (20). Therefore, (21) is uniquely maximized when w = 1 and Q T = 0, and the maximum value is 2pα t . In other words, the 1030 R. KOETHER ET AL.
oracle can limit the player's expected fortune to 2pα t by always announcing heads, and a positive probability of betting on tails only decreases the player's expected fortune against this strategy. This proves our claim. We have now shown that optimal play when p > α /(α + α t ) is given by P t|H = 1 and P t|T = 0, and Q a|says H = 1, Q a|says T = 0, and w = 1.
We summarize this discussion in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. (Optimal play.) Assume without loss of generality that p ≥ 1 2 and α > α t . The optimal strategy for the oracle in stage one is given by
For the player, if p ≤ α /(α + α t ) then the optimal strategy is given by
w ≥ w c and Q a|says H = Q a|says T = 1 2 1 + w c w ,
is optimal, where w c = (α − α t )/(α + α t ) is the player's critical wager. Under optimal play, the player's fortune satisfies
The analysis of the n flip, k lie game
We now use the above analysis to solve a problem posed in [3] . As in the original lying oracle problem, the oracle will flip a coin n times and may lie at most k times, with k ≤ n, but as above, the oracle will use a biased coin, where the coin will land on heads with probability p > 1 2 . If the player and the oracle play optimally, then define E n,k to be the expected payoff for the game of n flips and k lies.
Under these conditions, if the game begins with n flips and k lies, then α t = E n−1,k and α l = E n−1,k−1 , as these represent the expected payoffs for the game with one fewer flip and either the same number of lies (the oracle told the truth) or one less lie (the oracle lied about the outcome). The task is to specify these expected payoffs in terms of n, k, and p.
We first recall from the previous results that E n,0 = 2 n and that E n,n = (2p)E n−1,n−1 = (2p) n . Furthermore, Theorem 1 asserts that if p < α l α t + α l then the player's expected payoff under optimal play is
while if p ≥ α l α t + α l then the player will bet on heads and will have an expected payoff of
It is convenient to work with the reciprocals of our expected payoffs E n,k . We therefore summarize the above results as follows:
The functions g n,k (x) and f n,k (x)
Since the value of E −1 n,k is defined recursively, we can define functions g n,k (x) recursively such that the reciprocals E −1 n,k have the following form:
Accordingly, we define
Proof. Let p ∈ [ 
If k = n then the oracle can lie every time. The player will always bet everything on the coin (heads), and so the player's expected fortune is
Thus, in all cases
Since the expected payoff to the player depends on how p compares to
we would like to find a way to compare p involving the functions g n,k (x). We accomplish this in the next lemma.
Lemma 2. For all n ≥ 1 and all 0 ≤ k ≤ n, the player should bet on heads (regardless of the oracle's prediction) if and only if
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Proof. The optimal strategy for the player is to bet on heads regardless of the oracle's prediction if and only
Conversely, if p < α l /(α t + α l ) then the above computation yields
However, by (22
as desired. Therefore, let us define
Lemma 2 may thus be restated by saying the player should bet on heads if and only if f n,k (p) ≥ 0. The following two lemmata describe some of the basic properties of the function g n,k (x).
Lemma 3. Let g n,k (x) be defined as in (22). Then
Proof. The proof is by induction on n and k. We need to establish two base cases: k = 0 and k = 1, each for all n ≥ k + 1.
First, when
Now let k = 1 and begin with n = 2. It has been shown above that
, 1] and all n ≥ 2. We now proceed by induction on k. Suppose that g n,s (x) ≤ g n−1,s (x) for all x ∈ [ 1 2 , 1], all n ≥ s + 1, and some s ≥ 1. We will show that g n,s+1 (x) ≤ g n−1,s+1 (x) for all x ∈ [ 1 2 , 1] and all n ≥ s + 2. This will complete the proof. First, g s+1,s+1 (x) = 1 and
So the statement is true when n = s + 2. Now suppose that it is true when n = r for some r ≥ s + 2. That is, suppose that
This completes the proof. Proof. By definition (22) of g n,k (x) we have
Exploiting the similarity between this inequality and Pascal's formula,
it is easy to show by induction that
It then follows, for fixed k, x, and j , that
is a polynomial in n while x n−k+j is an exponential function in n, with base x < 1. Therefore,
Therefore, according to (23), for fixed k and p, we have f n,k (p) ≤ 0 for sufficiently large n. Let m k be the largest value of n such that f n,k (p) > 0, which by Lemma 2 implies that the player should play a mixed strategy given by Theorem 1 for all n > m k . For n ≤ m k , the player should bet on heads and the oracle should announce heads.
It is clear from the definitions of g n,k (x) and f n,k (x) that they are increasing functions on the interval [ 
This last quantity is nonpositive, since according to Lemma 3, g n, k 
This lemma implies that each m k is unique and the sequence {m k } is a strictly increasing sequence.
Closed-form expressions for g n,k (x) and f n,k (x)
We first motivate the way the functions will be written by developing several special cases. We begin by noting that g n,0 (x) = x n , and we proceed to develop expressions for the functions when k = 1 and k = 2. When k = 1, then
by the definition of f n,k (x) given by (23). Furthermore, when n > m 1 , we use the recursive formula for g n,k (x) given by (22) to express g n,1 (x) in closed form:
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We now proceed to the k = 2 case. Using (23), we find that
Next, when n > m 2 , we calculate g n,2 (x) using the recursive formula (22):
Generalizing from the above, we now state the closed formula for the general case. When n = 20, we have g 20,4 (p) = 870p 20 + 101p 18 + 13p 13 + 2p 8 + p 2 . Therefore, the expected payoff to the player in the game G 20,4 when p = 
Open questions
The question arises, is there a simple relationship between the integers k and m k ? In the extended example above, we saw that and n is large, to maintain credibility, the oracle needs to lie an average of at least once in every 7.1 coin tosses. (This may sound contrary to everyday experience, but, by lying, the oracle is depleting a valuable resource: its ability to lie.) Table 1 summarizes some numerical results obtained from MAPLE, using values of k up to 10 000. 
